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The Local Government Act 2000 allowed for
the creation of directly-elected mayors in those
English boroughs that vote in favour of the
idea in a local referendum. However, in spite of
a large degree of high-level cross-party support
for the idea, only a handful of municipalities
have opted for the model since then. Indeed,
the coalition government’s attempts to
introduce elected mayors into England’s nine
largest cities in 2012 were rejected by voters in
every area apart from Bristol. The result is that
only 16 municipalities (not including Greater
London) currently operate this model of
governance. Instead of elected mayors, most
English councils have adopted a leader and
cabinet model, which requires councillors to
elect a leader who then appoints members to
executive positions.
Some scholars have argued that the reasons
for introducing elected mayors into English
local government were unclear or incoherent
(Orr, 2004). However, most agree that they
aimed to try and improve accountability,
leadership and/or decision-making capacity
within local government (see for example
Fenwick and Elcock, 2005; Fenwick et al., 2006;
Bochel and Bochel, 2010). (Although others
have advocated the idea of elected mayors
based on normative arguments of democracy,
visibility and accountability, this paper does
not address these other criteria.)
This line of argument holds that allowing a
single individual to draw on a popular mandate
for executive authority enables them to sit
‘above’ party factions and adopt a more strategic
perspective. Interestingly, many in the first
wave of mayors were elected in boroughs that
had a history of poor leadership and/or
antagonistic party politics (Randle, 2004)—
and independent or opposition candidates,
who were not associated with previous scandals
or poor performance, enjoyed a remarkable
degree of success (Elcock, 2008). Since their
previous governance models had failed, local
people were perhaps keen to try a new approach
in order to drive improvements in the local
authority (Fenwick et al., 2006).
English local authorities have been
experiencing a period of austerity since the UK
government’s 2010 Spending Review, which
set out how funding for municipalities would
be reduced by an average of 7.25% per annum
between 2010/11 and 2014/15 (Ferry and
Eckersley, 2012). More recent announcements
have confirmed that the reductions will continue
on a similar trajectory in 2015/16. As a result,
municipalities are having to re-assess the level
of services they can provide to ensure that they
can continue to balance the books: something
that is a legal requirement for all English
councils. Crucially, elected mayors in England
only require the support of one-third of
councillors to ensure that their budgets are
approved, which should help them to take the
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This paper identifies the key factors that have affected the ability of elected mayors
in some German cities to introduce austerity measures in response to serious
financial problems. Drawing on a detailed study of six municipalities in North
Rhine-Westphalia, it highlights how the mayor’s managerial and/or legal
experience, as well as the party-political make-up of the council, played a vital
role in determining the success of savings initiatives. Such findings have
important implications for countries such as England, where some have argued
for the introduction of elected mayors in order to improve decision-making
capacity within local government.
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long-term decisions that are likely to be
necessary to cope with these austerity pressures.
Cuts in public services are invariably unpopular
and difficult to implement (Pierson, 2002). As
a result, executive mayors that do not need as
much support from within the council should
find it easier to push through austerity initiatives
compared to a cabinet that requires majority
support from elected members.
Nonetheless, as this paper demonstrates,
elected mayors in six towns in the German state
of North Rhine-Westphalia have had mixed
success in reducing substantial municipal
deficits. Various factors have played a crucial
role in determining whether they can deliver
balanced budgets. These include the
educational and professional background of
the mayor, their desire and ability to assume
personal responsibility for implementing
austerity measures and the party political
situation within the council. Based on this
experience, English policy-makers should not
necessarily view elected mayors as being a
silver bullet for increasing municipal capacity—
a lesson that applies as much to issues of budgetary
discipline as it does to other policy sectors.
Background to elected mayors in Germany
Following the Second World War, state structures
in Germany were heavily influenced by the
victorious powers. Each of the allies introduced
a system of local government into their zone of
occupation that was based on their own country’s
existing model. This meant that councils in north-
western Germany, including the most populous
state (Land) of North Rhine-Westphalia, were
governed by the traditional British model of a
non-executive ceremonial mayor working
together with a non-political town clerk
(Stadtdirektor) who was in charge of the local
administration. This model became known as
the Doppelspitze and contrasted with the
powerful directly-elected executive mayors
(Monospitze) that were introduced in the
southern American zone, and the French-style
council-elected executive mayors in the west.
Instead of having a strong executive, which the
British feared could represent a potential threat
to local democracy, municipal statutes in the
north-western states were designed so that most
decisions would be taken by council committees
(Wollmann, 2004).
However, during the 1990s, all of the various
Land governments outside the former American
zone changed their constitutions to introduce
directly-elected mayors. The Doppelspitze model
had attracted particular criticism, on the basis
that the division between administration and
policy was not clear (Ellwein, 1976) and therefore
‘responsibility disappeared into the Bermuda
triangle of mayor, chief executive and leader of
the dominant political party’ (Wehling and Kost,
2010, p. 11). In addition, the experience of
municipalities in the southern states suggested
that elected mayors were better placed to deal
with budgetary problems, because they could
assume a more dominant position vis-à-vis the
other councillors when compared to the
Doppelspitze model, and therefore found it easier
to push through cost-saving initiatives (Timm-
Arnold, 2011; Banner, 2012). Similarly,
authorities in those states that were led by a
single individual were more effective at
implementing policy (Wollmann, 2005). The
result was that legislation to introduce directly-
elected executives was passed in North Rhine-
Westphalia in 1994, and votes for the first mayors
(or Bürgermeister) in this state were cast five
years later.
German local government in an era of
austerity
Notably, these reforms were introduced at the
beginning of a period of financial crisis for local
government. Following unification in 1990,
councils in western Germany were required to
transfer 3% of their annual income to the east in
order to satisfy a constitutional requirement for
equal living standards across the federation. In
addition, unification caused a deep recession
that led to a sharp drop in revenue from local
business taxation—the most important source of
revenue for German municipalities. The result
was that local government got into a financial
crisis that resembled the last days of the Weimar
Republic (Wachendorfer-Schmidt, 1998;
Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006), although
thankfully the mass unemployment that
characterized this period was absent.
Nonetheless, the recession affected cities in
the Ruhrgebiet (the traditional industrial area of
North Rhine-Westphalia) particularly badly, to
the extent that the Land government introduced
legislation targeted at those authorities that were
unable to generate sufficient revenue to fund
their expenditure. Since 1991, each municipality
that cannot deliver a balanced budget has had to
submit a plan to the regional Bezirk authorities
(a tier of government that sits between
municipalities and the Land) setting out how it
would be able to generate sufficient revenue to
fund its spending for the next five years. If their
plan, known as the Haushaltssicherungskonzept
(budgetary assurance programme) is approved
by the Bezirk, the council can receive additional
financial help from the state government.
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However, if the plan is not authorized, it may
only borrow up to one-quarter of the amount
borrowed for investments in the previous year,
and is only permitted to deliver statutory services
and undertake urgent or necessary activities.
The law has been invoked with increasing
regularity in North Rhine-Westphalia since then,
as the financial situation for local government
across the state has become ever more precarious
(Timm-Arnold, 2011). Although most
municipalities recovered slowly during the 1990s
from the post-unification recession, they were
hit by a sudden 9% drop in business tax revenues
in 2001 after the federal government reduced
the number of firms who had to pay the tax
(Wehling and Kost, 2010). By 2005, 194 of the
427 councils in North Rhine-Westphalia were
unable to produce balanced budgets—and 105
of these municipalities did not have their deficit
reduction plans approved by the Bezirk
authorities (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). In
2007, local governments across the state were
borrowing an average of 763 euro per resident,
compared to 123 euro at the beginning of the
century (Holtkamp, 2010a), and only 12% of
councils had balanced budgets (Gerlach, 2010).
More recently, the 2007/08 financial crisis
has prevented councils from recovering from
this position, despite the fact that Germany has
not experienced economic problems on a scale
comparable with other European countries
(Hesse and Ellwein, 2012). By 2013, local
government across the country owed 7.7 billion
euro, and the Land government of North Rhine-
Westphalia agreed an ‘aid package’ of 5.85 billion
euro for 61 of its most impoverished councils—
although municipalities must agree stringent
budgets in order to be eligible for this extra
funding (Timm-Arnold, 2013).
Endogenous reasons for financial problems
The events outlined above, together with socio-
economic problems caused by the decline of
traditional industries, have undoubtedly
contributed to the financial crisis in German
local government. However, they have also led
to the development of a ‘victim thesis’
(Pleschberger, 2008, p. 53) and distracted
attention away from endogenous factors that
might also affect the municipality’s ability to
deliver a balanced budget. The financial situation
of municipalities with similar socio-economic
problems varies considerably (Timm-Arnold,
2011)—something that has been attributed to
different internal decision-making processes,
which are influenced by the local authority
constitution and budgetary governance
arrangements (Junkernheinrich, 1991, p. 77;
Vetter and Holtkamp, 2008, p. 32). Furthermore,
‘home-made’ factors, including the party-political
make-up of the council and the desire and capacity
of key municipal actors to balance the books,
have also played a role. Since 1999, the most
important actors in North Rhine-Westphalian
councils have been the popularly-elected mayors,
and they have played a crucial (though often
overlooked) role in decisions associated with
budgetary consolidation (Vetter and Holtkamp,
2008).* For example, some Bürgermeister have
placed a higher priority on introducing austerity
measures than others, often for political reasons.
This paper builds on the findings of previous
German-language studies (Holtkamp, 2010b;
Timm-Arnold, 2011), by highlighting how other
countries (particularly England) can learn from
the experience of North Rhine-Westphalian
municipalities. These studies, which took a
qualitative and an empirical-analytical approach
to examining the governance arrangements
within municipalities, identified various factors
that influence the ability of elected mayors to
address financial problems. Chief among these is
the need for them to lead the local administration
and have relevant experience of public service
management in order to be successful. This
leadership is shaped by their willingness to deliver
balanced budgets, their expertise and knowledge
of local government, and their powers of
persuasion. Unsurprisingly, those mayors whose
plans for delivering balanced budgets have the
support of a majority of elected councillors are
also more likely to be successful in implementing
savings initiatives. In contrast, mayors who have
a background in local politics have tended to be
less successful at addressing financial problems.
They have shown significantly less interest in
normative goals such as running balanced
budgets than their counterparts with legal or
management experience, which has meant that
they have not mobilized as much support for
savings initiatives within the local authority.
In addition, political parties in the Land of
North Rhine-Westphalia are more dominant
than in other German states (Gehne, 2007),
which has influenced local governance
arrangements. For example, the weaker nature
of political parties in Baden-Württemberg, along
with a culture of consensus, makes it easier for
elected mayors in this Land to rely on their
popular mandate and assert their influence within
the council. In North Rhine-Westphalia the
*Over the past two years the universities of Bochum,
Hagen, Freiburg and Kaiserslautern have been
involved in a major study into the causes of municipal
deficits across Germany.
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parties are more competitive and clearly divided
into controlling and opposition groups, which
reduces the power of the mayor vis-à-vis other
politicians (Holtkamp, 2008; Bogumil and
Holtkamp, 2013). In particular, if the mayor is
either independent or not a member of the same
party as the controlling group (‘cohabitation’),
he or she finds it very difficult to implement their
policy programme.*
Methodology
This paper is based on comparative case study
investigations of elected mayors in six towns in
the Ruhrgebiet area of North Rhine-Westphalia
during the period 1999–2009. In order to identify
any endogenous reasons for their relative success
in coping with austerity, the six towns each had
similar socio-economic conditions but varying
levels of deficit, and were governed by a mixture
of different political parties (see table 1). The
fieldwork involved interviewing the mayors, the
leaders of the Social Democrat (SPD) and
Christian Democrat (CDU) council factions,
chairmen of the local SPD and CDU parties, and
journalists from local newspapers. In total, we
conducted 23 interviews in six district councils.
In one case (town E) a ‘consultative’ austerity
commissioner (Sparkommissar) had been
installed by the Bezirk authority and he was also
interviewed: the other five municipalities were
not subjected to this intervention.
The interview questions related to the
position of the mayors in budget policy, their
impact on council and management activities
and their preferences for introducing austerity
initiatives. The interviews were supplemented
by analysis of budget plans, protocols of council
meetings, budget speeches, audit reports of the
Gemeindeprüfungsanstalt (local audit
commission), and newspaper articles. All
translations from the original German are our
own.
Research findings
Upon completion of the fieldwork, each mayor
was categorized as being either ‘management-
focused’ or ‘policy-focused’. The contrast between
managerial and policy-focused mayors is a legacy
of the municipal constitutions that operated in
North Rhine-Westphalia up until the first directly-
elected mayors took office in 1999. Before this
reform, the city manager (Stadtdirektor) was
appointed by the council to run the
administration, and he or she needed to have
certain skills and qualifications to get the job,
such as a legal education or managerial
experience. This effectively excluded most local
politicians from the post. However, directly-
elected mayors require no such qualifications,
and therefore political group leaders were able
to put themselves forward as candidates and had
a very good chance of being elected. As a result,
a large number of mayors with political
backgrounds have taken office in the past 15
years.
The decision about whether a mayor was
management- or policy-focused was based on his
or her professional background. This was
determined by a mayor’s occupation prior to
election and the subject(s) he or she had studied
within further and higher education. The
management-focused mayors had degrees in
public administration, law or management,
whereas the policy-focused mayors had either
studied a different subject at university or did
not attend higher education, and had a
background in local politics. Taken together,
these factors comprised the ‘passive’ precondition
for austerity leadership in our context. This was
complemented by an ‘active’ precondition, which
comprised their powers of persuasion and
willingness to get involved in micro-political
processes, particularly in relation to the majority
group in the council and the administration.
This ‘active’ aspect was identified from the
interviews.
As table 1 shows, the mayors in our study had
different priorities and varying levels of
experience of local administration, and also
worked in different political circumstances. These
factors played a key role in determining the
extent to which they were able to deliver balanced
budgets.
For example, town A had an SPD,
management-focused mayor, who worked
together with an SPD/Green party-majority
council, while town B had a CDU, management-
focused mayor, who worked together with a
CDU-majority council. Not only were these two
municipalities better placed financially than the
other case study authorities, but their budgets
were also much healthier than most other towns
in the state with populations over 20,000. In
both cases the mayors played a key role in
financial planning, albeit for different reasons.
The Bürgermeister in town A viewed a balanced
budget as normatively desirable: he had a career
and training background in local
administration, co-operated constructively with
the Bezirk authorities and—in his words—
*The level of party-politicization in North Rhine-
Westphalia may well be a legacy of the British model
that operated within the state for five decades; if so,
elected mayors in English municipalities could face
similar problems when trying to deliver their
objectives.
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‘sacrificed’ a successful coalition with the Green
party in order to reduce spending on staff. The
mayor of town B wanted to achieve a balanced
budget for instrumental reasons. Together with
the CDU-dominated council, he wanted to
ensure that the municipality’s budgetary plans
would be approved by the Bezirk authorities
and therefore be able to implement his
investment priorities. As a trained lawyer, he
did not find it difficult to interpret the legal
provisions associated with local government
finance and was therefore able to discuss these
directly with the Bezirk and prevent his
investment decisions from being challenged.
Furthermore, the management board and
leading councillors in town A had a unified
purpose: the mayor emphasized the importance
of a ‘team performance’ and the municipality
having a strong corporate identity. In particular,
close co-operation between the mayor, the
portfolio holder for finance and the leader of the
SPD councillors ensured that financial
consolidation became a central objective for both
the administration and the majority group, which
enabled the municipality to repel the demands
of special interests for additional spending.
Finally, since the mayor was fully aware of the
legal restrictions on the council’s budget, he was
not reliant on advice from the finance
department. This meant he could discuss
spending plans more effectively with the Bezirk
authorities and with local councillors. Similarly,
the mayor of town B also enjoyed a close working
relationship with the leader of the CDU group,
which meant he could rely on support from
within the council.
Moreover, the mayors of both towns
prevented councillors from blocking their
initiatives and marginalized the finance
department—with the result that the
Bürgermeister played important roles in
budgetary decision-making. In municipality A,
the SPD Group did not give any Green councillors
a portfolio responsibility and did not create a
formal treasury position on the executive board.
In town B, the finance director is a member of
the SPD* (the political opponents of the
governing CDU mayor and majority group). In
2007, he proposed that the council prepare a
voluntary Haushaltssicherungskonzept—which,
if it were not approved by the Bezirk auditors,
would result in the municipality risking its
investment plans. This idea was dismissed by the
Bürgermeister with the support of a majority of
the council, thus demonstrating their influential
position in budgetary policy. Indeed, in both
towns there is a close interlocking relationship
between the majority group and a very strong
and assertive mayor. These ingredients helped
them both to keep the budget on track.
The mayors of towns C and D were both
policy-focused and members of the same party
as the controlling group on the council. Both
also had large structural budgetary deficits during
the period under investigation. However, in
contrast to A and B, the drive for fiscal
consolidation in both municipalities was led by
the director of finance rather than the mayor.
This is not a recipe for success, since the finance
director is often politically neutral (especially in
smaller districts) and has no institutional right to
assert authority among the majority group on
the council. Instead, he or she can only rely on
appealing to elected members for spending
restraint. In town C, the Bürgermeister was not
even involved in negotiations with the Bezirk
Table 1. Political make-up of the case study councils.
Town No. of Per capita Characterization of Political make-up of council
inhabitants budgetary deficit mayor
in 2003
A 26,000 -72 Management-focused SPD/Green coalition control from
(SPD) 1999 onwards
B 23,000 -42 Management-focused CDU majority control up to 2004;
(CDU) de facto CDU majority control from
2004 onwards
C 98,000 -226 Policy-focused (SPD) SPD/Green coalition control from
1999 onwards
D 31,000 -160 Policy-focused (CDU) CDU minority control from 1999
onwards
E 87,000 -253 Management-focused CDU minority control 1999–2004;
(initially CDU; later SPD minority control 2004–2009
independent)
F 29,000 -100 Management-focused CDU minority control 1999–2004;
(independent) CDU/Green coalition control 2004–
2009
*Senior officers in German local government are
often affiliated to political parties, especially in larger
municipalities.
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authorities over a budgetary assurance
programme in 2007. Instead, the finance director
and the party group leaders led these discussions
on behalf of the municipality, and stressed that
the council would not tolerate austerity measures
that required significant staff cuts or a reduction
in the quality of local sports facilities. A new
mayor took office in 2004 and appeared
committed to balancing the budget, but his efforts
to achieve this (such as through plans to privatize
local utilities) were undermined by the SPD
majority group and its leader—even though
they were members of the same party as the
Bürgermeister. In contrast to town A, this meant
that the new mayor was unable to form a coalition
in favour of austerity policies that could rebut the
demands of special interests (including his
predecessor and local sports organizations).
In town D, the policy-focused CDU mayor
also faced a strong opponent in the shape of
the leader of the CDU group, which had
minority control of the council. Indeed, the
group leader drafted the council’s 2007 budget
as a compromise, following opposition to an
initial version from the mayor that had
suggested staff numbers would be reduced.
Similarly, the Bürgermeister did not make
other savings proposals during his mayoralty;
instead, he left such decisions to the finance
department. Since the director of finance does
not have the same capacity to implement
decisions as the mayor, this reduced the
likelihood that savings would be delivered. In
addition, after the council came under no
overall control, the minority SPD group could
oppose any policies quite effectively, which
made it even more difficult for the mayor to
lead an austerity coalition.
Moreover, the mayors of towns C and D
were only partially concerned with delivering
balanced budgets. In particular, the
Bürgermeister of town C between 1999 and
2004 preferred to stress municipal spending,
especially on local sports facilities. In contrast to
towns A and B, no leading politicians stressed
how financial prudence was necessary to ensure
that the council maintained control over its
spending plans. The mayors of both C and D
depended on their finance departments for
advice on the technical and legal aspects of
budgets, and their powers of persuasion were
limited by powerful leaders of their party groups
on the council. The councils were heavily
politicized and senior officers were not
empowered to assume the leadership of an
austerity coalition—in contrast to cases A and B.
Towns E and F both had independent,
management-focused mayors. The
Bürgermeister of town E was constrained by
various issues, including disappointment
among the majority CDU group about his
performance as head of the administration
and having to deal with a council that could
veto key decisions. A special budgetary
commissioner from the Bezirk authorities
managed to overcome these blockages in 2007/
08, signalling a new beginning for all of the
relevant actors. However, this intervention
was a failure over the longer term (Holtkamp,
2009, p. 154), because it did not address the
cause of the problem—namely the ‘poisonous’
relationship between the mayor and the council
that had led to the initial conflict. The
conditions of ‘cohabitation’ placed particular
demands on the capacity of the mayor to lead
effectively—particularly on the issue of
budgetary stewardship, which was lacking in
town E.
Table 2 summarizes the above discussion,
based on the characteristics of each case study
municipality and the key factors that helped
mayors to balance their council budgets. It
shows how mayors with a background in local
politics showed less interest in financial restraint
compared to those who had legal or
management training. Those municipalities
that were led by a management-focused mayor
tended to be in better financial health. We
attribute this in part to their greater
understanding and expertise in public
management, factors which we have termed as
a ‘passive’ precondition for leading the
administration. Alongside these factors, the
mayor’s ability to influence the council—the
‘active’ precondition—also played a decisive
role. Where mayors were able to rebut the
claims of special interests (typically in the case
of town A) and build an austerity coalition
(town B), plans to balance the budget remained
on course. In contrast, policy-focused mayors
(towns C and D) lacked leadership, because
they did not take personal responsibility for
the budget and were therefore reluctant and/
or unable to persuade key actors to support
austerity policies.
Furthermore, the politicized nature of local
democracy in North Rhine-Westphalia restricts
the power of the mayor if he or she does not
have a party base, or if the council chamber is
controlled by the opposition. A Bürgermeister
in this situation has difficulty implementing
sustainable savings initiatives. This was the
case in town E, where even an external
commissioner was unable to break through
entrenched party structures and address the
financial problems effectively.
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Conclusions
Based on the experiences of six German
municipalities, the mayor has to take personal
responsibility for leading the austerity
programme in order to address financial
problems effectively. Those Bürgermeister with
management or legal backgrounds are more
likely to be able to do this because they can
process relevant information quickly without
having to rely on others, and therefore assume
a leadership role more easily. In addition,
mayors need to persuade other key individuals
(such as the leader of the majority group and
the finance director) to join a coalition that can
overcome opposition from special interests,
party ideologues, and other actors that have
the ability to veto decisions. This approach led
to success in towns A and B—in contrast to
town C, where the mayor delegated
responsibility for budgetary negotiations to
finance officers. A key factor here is the need
for the mayor to have a power base within the
council, particularly in those areas that have a
strong tradition of party-political ‘competitive’
democracy such as North Rhine-Westphalia
(or indeed some towns in England). If the
mayoralty and the council are controlled by
different political parties (as in town E), the
Bürgermeister is independent (town F), or the
mayor is not able to control members of their
own party (towns C and D), their capacity to act
is limited and any savings initiatives will be at
risk.
Although this paper has focused on the
critical success factors associated with
implementing austerity budgets in German
municipalities, its lessons apply equally to other
policy sectors. Elected mayors can have
significant decision-making capacity, and
therefore can implement sustainable and
effective approaches to dealing with the current
austerity agenda under certain conditions. Our
findings echo many of the reasons that have
been cited in favour of English councils adopting
directly-elected executives in recent years,
particularly around the need for greater
certainty and stability in decision-making. Such
arguments are especially relevant for
municipalities that are often either ‘hung’ or
where control switches regularly between
political parties.
However, our research has also highlighted
various factors that influence the decision-
making capacity of elected mayors in Germany.
For example, the Bürgermeister needs to have
sufficient support from within the council, as
well as the desire and ability to be involved in
the day-to-day management of the authority.
In particular, he or she needs to take personal
responsibility for budgetary decision-making,
rather than delegating this to other politicians
or the director of finance. If these conditions
are present, the mayor is able to take and
implement difficult decisions in order to
maintain financial health over the long term.
Yet elected mayors with a political background
often lack the skills that are necessary for this
leadership role, which means that these mayors
are unable to build an austerity coalition and
rebut the claims of special interests. As such,
they might want to consider undertaking
management or legal training, in order that
Table 2. Leadership experience of mayors in the case study municipalities.
Town Leadership drive Leadership capacity Budget trend
Desire to deliver
a balanced
budget ‘Passive’ precondition (technical ‘Active’ precondition  (powers
knowledge and expertise, of persuasion and willingness
based on education, skills to get involved in micro-political
and employment background) processes, based on fieldwork
observations)
Management-focused mayor
A X X X Positive
B (X) (X) X Positive
Independent (management-focused) mayor
E 0 (X) 0 Negative
F X X (X) Neutral
Policy-focused mayor
C 0/(X)* 0 0 Negative
D 0 0 0 Negative
Key: X = Characteristic present. (X) = Characteristic partly present or constrained. 0 = Characteristic not present. * = Change of mayor in 2004.
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they can take personal control of key issues
facing their municipality and lead from the
front.
Given that post-war local democracy in
North Rhine-Westphalia was based on the
British model, our findings should provide
food for thought for any English municipalities
that have recently adopted elected executives—
as well as national politicians who might want
to introduce them as a default option for local
governance.
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